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Monetary and Non-Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions 
Mechanism 
 
By DAVID MASCLET, CHARLES NOUSSAIR, STEVEN TUCKER, and MARIE-CLAIRE VILLEVAL * 
 
A demand for behavioral norms arises when members of a group have individual incentives to 
take actions that reduce the group’s overall welfare (James S. Coleman, 1990). Norms require 
enforcement with a system of sanctions that penalize deviations from acceptable behavior (George C. 
Homans, 1961). Formal sanctions include fines or restrictions implemented by a legal system or private 
individuals that impose costs of money and time on the offender. However, informal sanctions such as 
peer pressure, gossip, or social ostracism might in some cases also be effective deterrents, and expressions 
of social acceptance might be effective in encouraging group-oriented behavior (Peter M. Blau, 1964). 
Indeed, the fact that expressions of approval and disapproval are commonly observed in human 
interaction suggests that they must influence the behavior of at least some individuals. In recognition of 
the importance of informal sanctions, economists have integrated phenomena such as peer pressure 
(Eugene Kandel and Edward P. Lazear, 1992; John M. Barron and Kathy Paulson-Gjerde, 1997), and the 
avoidance of social disapproval (George A. Akerlof, 1980; Heinz Hollander, 1990; Assar Lindbeck et al., 
1999) into theoretical models. Social pressures are thought to be a major factor behind high voter 
participation (Carol-Jean Uhlaner, 1989; Stephen Knack, 1992) and compliance with the law (Tom R. 
Tyler, 1990).  
In this study, we use experimental methods to study the power of informal sanctions. The context 
is a simple game called the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM). The VCM is appealing because 
it starkly isolates the conflict between self-interest and group-interest and allows a simple measure of the 
extent of group-interested behavior. It has also been widely studied in the laboratory, facilitating the 
interpretation of our results within a large literature. In the version of the game that we consider, each 
player receives an identical initial endowment of money. Players simultaneously select a fraction of the 
endowment to contribute to a group account, while keeping the remainder. All funds in the group account 
pay a positive return to each member of the group. The parameters are chosen so that each agent has a 
dominant strategy to contribute zero to the group account, but at the group optimum, every agent 
contributes all of his endowment to the group account.  
 Experiments have documented that there is initially a positive level of contribution to the group 
account.1 The level of contribution declines with repetition (Mark R. Isaac et al. 1985; Isaac and James 
M. Walker, 1988b; Andreoni, 1988; Joachim Weimann, 1994; Keser, 1996) and readily responds to 
changes in treatment variables. For example, contribution rates increase if communication between the 
parties is allowed before each play (see for example Isaac and Walker, 1988a or Elinor Ostrom et al., 
1992). See John O. Ledyard (1995) for a survey of previous studies. 
It is known that a formal sanctioning system increases contributions. In a recent paper, Ernst Fehr 
and Simon Gaechter (2000), hereafter FG, study the following two-stage game. In the first stage, four 
subjects play the VCM game described above. In the second stage, each subject, after observing each 
other group member’s contribution, has an opportunity to reduce the earnings of any of the other players 
in his group, at a cost to himself. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium to the two-stage game, agents 
never punish because it lowers their own payoff, and because the punishment is not credible, there are no 
contributions in the first stage. In their experiment, however, FG observe that agents do exhibit a 
willingness to punish other members of their group, and that the availability of the punishment 
opportunity increases contributions markedly. The result is obtained under both Partner (in which the 
same players interact repeatedly) or under Stranger (in which players interact with different players each 
period)2 matching protocols.  
An obvious possible conclusion to draw is that the availability of monetary fines is the cause of 
the increase in contributions. We will refer to this interpretation, stated more precisely below, as the 
Direct Punishment Hypothesis (DPH).3 DPH will be supported, for example, if agents believe that a 
failure to contribute an amount others view as sufficient will result in punishment that will make lower 
contributions unprofitable.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Direct Punishment Hypothesis: The opportunity for agents to reduce the monetary payoff 
of others after observing their decisions increases contribution levels. 
 
However, in addition to a formal system of monetary fines, the sanctioning system is a vehicle to 
express disapproval of other’s decisions. This suggests a second possible explanation for FG’s result: that 
the opportunity to express disapproval of other agents’ decisions in itself increases the level of 
contribution. We refer to this explanation as the Indirect Punishment Hypothesis (IPH). There is reason to 
believe that this might be the case. In a repeated game, punishment serves as a form of pre-play 
communication for future periods, and even unstructured communication is known to increase 
contributions. Punishment may be a particularly powerful form of communication because it can serve as 
a warning that the sanctioner will lower his future contribution if the sanctioned player does not increase 
his own contribution. Additionally, whether or not the game is repeated, if players incur a disutility from 
receiving an expression of disapproval, they may make higher contributions in order to avoid or in 
response to an informal sanction.4  
 
Hypothesis 2: Indirect Punishment Hypothesis: The opportunity for agents to express disapproval of 
others’ decisions increases contribution levels. 
 
If the IPH is correct, informal sanctions that communicate disapproval but do not reduce 
pecuniary payoffs can also be effective in increasing contribution levels. The experiment reported here 
isolates the role of the IPH in increasing contributions in FG’s experiment. Our Monetary Punishment 
(MP) treatment, replicates the experiment of FG. Our Non-Monetary Punishment Treatment (NP) is 
identical to MP, except for one difference. Instead of having an opportunity to reduce the payoff of others, 
each player has an opportunity to communicate a level of disapproval of each other player’s contribution. 
This creates a system of informal sanctions. We study the system under both Partner and Stranger 
matching protocols. Higher contributions in NP than in a treatment where no sanctions are available 
would provide support for the IPH. Higher contributions in MP than in NP would indicate support for the 
DPH, since the only difference between MP and NP is the monetary dimension of the sanction. Higher 
contributions under Partner than under Stranger matching would suggest that the effectiveness of informal 
sanctions depends, at least in part, on repeated interaction.  
 
I. THE EXPERIMENT  
The experiment consisted of eleven sessions of 30 periods,5 divided into three segments of 10 
periods. Seven of the sessions were conducted at Purdue University, in the United States, and the other 
four at the Groupe d’Analyse et de Theorie Economique (GATE), at the Universite Lumiere Lyon II, in 
France.6 The subjects were recruited from undergraduate courses in business and economics at both 
universities. Some of the subjects had participated in previous experiments, but all of the subjects were 
inexperienced in this particular type of experiment. No subject participated in more than one session of 
the study. On average, a session lasted 90 minutes including initial instruction and payment of subjects. 
The experiment was computerized using the REGATE program developed at GATE. 
Some information about the sessions is presented in Table 1. The first four columns indicate the 
session number, the number of subjects that took part in the session, the location and the treatment in 
effect in the session, MP, NP, or NS. The Matching Protocol columns indicate whether Partner or 
Stranger matching was in effect during each of the three ten period segments that made up a session. The 
Partner matching protocol was in effect for the first 10 periods of every session, and for the entirety of the 
four MP and the four NP sessions. Under the Partner matching protocol, the computer network separated 
the subjects into groups of size four. Group assignments remained constant for the entire session. Under 
the Stranger matching protocol,7 which was in effect from period 11 on in the three NS sessions, 
participants were re-matched each period in new groups of four. It was common information that each 
subject had a zero probability of being matched with any given other individual for two consecutive 
periods as well as ever being grouped again with the same three people.8 
 
[Table 1: About Here] 
 
During each ten-period segment subjects did not know whether or not the experiment would 
extend beyond the current segment. However, they knew the segment length and that each period in the 
segment would be identical. Thus, each ten period segment in MP or NP is most appropriately viewed as 
a ten period finitely repeated game. In periods 1-10 and periods 21-30 of each session, there was no 
punishment available. Activity in these periods proceeded as follows. At the beginning of each period, 
each agent was endowed with 20 Experimental Currency Units (ECU’s), with each ECU convertible to 
US dollars at 30 ECU = 1 dollar or to French francs at 5 ECU = 1 franc. Subjects simultaneously chose 
the portion of their endowment to contribute to a group account. They made this contribution decision by 
using a scroll bar on their computer screen. Each ECU contributed to the group account yielded a payoff 
of 0.4 ECU to each of the four members of the group. Each ECU not contributed by the subject was 
credited to the subject’s private account.9 Therefore, the earnings, in ECU, of individual i  in a period 
equaled 
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where ic  is the contribution of player i . It is easily seen from (1) that individual i’s earnings are 
maximized at ic = 0. If the game is played once, there is a dominant strategy to contribute zero. If the 
game is finitely repeated, the only subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is for all players to contribute 
zero in each period. 
In periods 11-20 of the four Monetary Punishment (MP) sessions, each period consisted of a two-
stage game in which the first stage followed exactly the same rules as in periods 1-10. At the beginning of 
the second stage, subjects were informed of the contribution levels of each of the other members of their 
group. They could then assign zero to ten punishment points to each of the three other group members. 
Each point received by a subject from any other agent reduced the first stage earnings of the subject by 10 
percent, with a maximum reduction of 100 percent. A subject observed the total number of points he 
received, but not how many each individual assigned to him. There was a cost to the agent assigning the 
points associated with each point allocated. The schedule of costs, denominated in ECU, is given in Table 
2.10  Subject i’s earnings in a period equaled 
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where 
ikP  is the number of points assigned by i  tok , and ( )ikPK  is the cost to i of assigning the points 
to k . Contributions were listed in random order and without a running identification number on the screen 
each period so that it was impossible to target another player for punishment for more than one period. As 
indicated previously, in the only subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, whether it is played once or 
finitely repeated, all players always contribute zero and never punish. 
 
[Table 2: About Here] 
 
Periods 11-20 of the four Non-Monetary Punishment (NP) and the three Non-Monetary 
Punishment Stranger (NS) sessions followed identical rules to periods 11-20 of MP, except that under NP 
and NS, each point awarded to an agent had no effect on her final earnings and was costless to assign.  As 
in MP, each agent had the opportunity to assign between zero and ten points to each other group member. 
The points represented the level of disapproval of a subject's contribution in the first stage. An allocation 
of ten points was to be assigned for the highest level of disapproval and zero points for the lowest level of 
disapproval. The points and their purpose were described to the subjects in the following language: 
 
“In this stage you have the opportunity to register your  approval or disapproval of each other 
group member’s decision by distributing points. You can award a large number of points to 
any member of your group if you disapprove of his or her decision (10 points for the most 
disapproval, 0 points for the least disapproval.)”11 
 
Under non-monetary sanctions, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in either the one-shot or the 
finitely repeated version of the game requires a level of contribution of zero, though any profile of point 
assignment is compatible with a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
At the end of each period in all treatments, the computer displayed the subject’s own initial 
endowment, own earnings from the first stage, own points received, own cost of points allocated (for 
MP), own overall earnings for both stages, each group member’s contribution, and the total group 
contribution. The computer program then continued to the next period.  
 
II. RESULTS 
Figures 1 and 2 show the time series of group contributions by period for each of the six groups that 
participated in MP at Purdue and at GATE respectively. Figures 3 and 4 display the corresponding data 
for NP. The bold lines indicate the average group contribution over all sessions. As described in result 1 
below, both the MP and NP data show the same patterns reported by FG: an increase in contributions 
when punishment is available in periods 11-20 and a fall in contributions when punishment in no longer 
available in periods 21-30.  
 
[Figures 1-4: About Here]  
 Result 1: The Direct and Indirect Punishment Hypotheses are both supported. Monetary and non-
monetary sanctions initially increase contributions, by a similar amount. Over time, however, 
monetary sanctions lead to higher contributions than non-monetary sanctions. After the 
opportunity to impose sanctions is lifted, contributions fall to similar levels in both treatments. 
 
Support for result 1: A Mann-Whitney rank-sum test12 of the difference between MP and NP in periods 
1-10, before sanctions become available, yields z = 0.246, not significant at conventional levels. The 
mean individual contribution in periods 1-10 is 6.03 for MP and 6.55 for NP. Contribution rates are 
higher in periods 11–20, when sanctions are available, than in the pooled data from periods 1-10 and 21-
30 for 10 of 12 groups in MP (significant at p < 0.05) and 10 of 11 groups in NP (p < 0.01). Contribution 
rates are higher in periods 11-20 than in periods 1-10 for 10 of 12 groups in MP and 7 of 11 groups in NP, 
despite the tendency for contributions to decline over time in the absence of punishment. The mean 
individual contribution in periods 11-20 is 11.14 in MP and 8.97 in NP. In periods 11-15 a rank-sum test 
of the difference between MP and NP yields an insignificant value of z = 0.09. However, for the data 
from period 20, we reject the hypothesis that NP has a median contribution greater than or equal to that in 
MP at the p < 0.025 level (z = 2.093). The contribution level is not different between MP and NP in 
periods 21-30, when sanctions are no longer available (z = 1.16). Average contributions are lower in 
periods 21-30 than in periods 11-20 for all 23 groups.  
 
[Figure 5: About Here] 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the mean contribution by period in each of the three NS sessions. Comparison 
of Figures 3, 4, and 5 suggests that at least some of the effectiveness of the non-monetary sanctions 
requires repeated interaction. This is stated more precisely in result 2.  
 
Result 2: When non-monetary sanctions are available, contribution levels are greater under 
Partner than under Stranger matching. 
 
Support for result 2: The mean individual contribution rates in periods 11-20 of NP and NS are 8.97 and 
4.97 respectively. A rank-sum test of the differences yields (z = 1.776, p < 0.05). Since the average 
contribution level is not higher in periods 1-10 in NP than in NS, the increase in contributions resulting 
from the availability of sanctions is greater in NP than in NS.  
 
The time series of average earnings by period in MP and NP are shown in Figure 6. In both MP 
and NP, average earnings increase when the punishment opportunity becomes available. The increase is 
immediate in NP, as contributions rise, and no costs of punishment are incurred. In MP, there is an initial 
decrease in earnings, due to costs paid by both punishers and the punished, which more than offsets the 
increase from higher contributions. After several periods, earnings are similar in MP and NP, as 
contribution rates rise in MP relative to NP, and the amount of sanctioning in MP declines. Result 3 
summarizes our findings on earnings. 
 
Result 3: Both types of sanction increase average earnings. Average earnings in the first five 
periods after the introduction of punishment are greater in NP than in MP. However, in periods 16-
20, MP and NP generate similar earnings.  
 
Support for result 3: Mean earnings in periods 11-15 are greater than the mean over periods 1-5 and 21-
25 for all 11 groups in the NP treatment (significant at p < 0.001) but only 6 of 12 groups in MP. Mean 
earnings in periods 16-20 are greater than the mean over periods 6-10 and 26-30 for all 11 groups in NP 
(p < 0.001) and 9 of 12 groups in MP (significant at  p < 0.1). NP yields significantly higher average 
earnings than MP in periods 11-15 (z = 1.416, p < 0.1). MP generates higher average earnings than NP in 
periods 16-20 (z = 0.923), and in period 20 (z = 1.14), but the differences are not significant.  
 [Figure 6: About Here] 
 
Results 4 and 5 concern the relationship between sanctions and contributions at the level of the 
individual subject. In their study, FG document a positive relationship between { }kcc -,0max , the 
negative difference between k’s contribution and the average contribution, and the number of points i 
assigns to k. Falk et al. (2000), who study the same game as FG, find that i assigns k more points the 
greater the value of { }ki cc -,0max , the negative difference between k’s contribution and i’s. In both 
studies, the sanctioning patterns were similar under Partner and Stranger matching. As indicated in result 
4, we replicate both of these earlier findings, and find that they carry over to non-monetary sanctions. 
 
Result 4: The level of both monetary and non-monetary sanctions assigned by one individual to 
another is increasing in (a) the negative difference of the contribution of the punished subject from 
the average level and (b) the negative difference of the contribution of the punished subject from 
the contribution of the punishing subject.  
 
Support for result 4: Table 3 contains the estimates from the following regression model: 
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The first three columns in the table contain the estimates for periods 11-20, and the last three 
columns include only the data from period 20, the final period of the segment.13 Both 1b  and 3b  are 
highly significant for the period 11-20 data in MP. As in Falk et al. (2000), player i  sanctions k  more the 
greater the negative deviation of k’s contribution is from i’s. However, there is an additional effect that i  
sanctions k  more, the further below the group average is k’s contribution, as observed by FG. Both of 
these effects also carry over to the NP treatment, where the two coefficients are also highly significant. 
All of the 1b  and 3b  coefficients have the same sign in period 20 as in 11-20 (though some are not 
significant due to fewer observations), indicating that the effects do not require repeated play. 
 
[Table 3: About Here] 
 
In MP, the effect of a greater positive difference of k’s contribution from i’s, indicated by the 
positive estimate of 2b , is to increase the amount that i  punishes k. However, the negative estimated 4b , 
means that i  punishes k  less, the more that k deviates positively from the group average. The signs of 2b  
and 4b  indicate that agents who contributed low amounts are more likely than other players to punish 
those who made high contributions. A similar pattern is documented by Falk et al. (2000), who interpret it 
as evidence of spiteful preferences on the part of some players. Agents with spiteful preferences receive 
lower utility as other agents’ earnings increase. A spiteful player in the MP treatment would both 
contribute a low amount and punish other agents. The fact that seven of the eight 
2b  and 4b  estimates 
are not significantly different from zero in NP and NS is also consistent with the presence of players with 
spiteful preferences. Since earnings cannot be changed during the sanctioning phase of NP nor of NS, 
spiteful preferences would not necessarily lead to sanctioning. 
 
[Figure 7 and Tables 4a and 4b: About Here] 
  
Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between the number of points an agent receives and the 
change in his contribution in the next period. The horizontal axis is the range of possible punishment 
points that could be received in period t , from 0 to 30 inclusive, and the vertical axis is the average 
change in contribution from period t  to 1+t , (the average over all i and t of ti
t
i cc -
+1 , where tic  is 
individual si'  contribution in period t ). The numbers above and below the bars in the graph correspond 
to the number of observations within that range of points received.  In MP, agents who receive one or 
more points tend to increase their contribution, while those who receive zero tend to lower it. In NP and 
NS, agents who receive more than 15 points, 50 percent of the maximum possible, on average raise their 
contribution in the next period, while those who receive less than 15 points tend to lower it. Conjecture 
one asserts that even after taking into account an overall tendency for those who contribute less (more) 
than average to raise (lower) their contribution in the next period, the receipt of sanctions increases 
contributions of those who previously contributed less than the group average. We characterize the 
relationship as a conjecture because we cannot be certain that the points themselves, rather than some 
other variable correlated with the number of points received, cause the increase in contribution. 
 
Conjecture 1: In each of the three treatme nts, individuals who contributed less than the group 
average in period t increase their contributions more in period t+1 the more points they receive. 
 
Support for conjecture 1: The estimates from the following regression model, shown in Tables 4a and 
4b, suggest that sanctions boost contributions, but only for those who contribute less than the group 
average: 
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1b  measures the effect of the total number of points player i receives on his change in 
contribution from one period to the next, and 2b  is the effect of the difference between individual si'  
contribution and the mean contribution level of his group in period t . The model is estimated separately 
for players who contributed more and less than the mean in period t. The 2b  estimates in Tables 4a and 
4b show a significantly negative relation between the deviation from the average and the subsequent 
change in contribution in all six estimated equations. However, the 
1b  estimates in Table 4a show that 
even after this effect is accounted for, both formal and informal sanctions raised contributions for 
individuals who contributed less than the average. 
 
Thus a correlation exists between the receipt of punishment points and the subsequent net change 
in contribution for those who contributed less than the group average. The estimates in Table 4b suggest 
that greater monetary sanctions actually lowered the contributions of those who contributed more than 
average, perhaps because they reciprocated the punishment inflicted on them. Under NP and NS this 
pattern was not observed.  
 
III. DISCUSSION 
Our experiment provides an example of how cooperation can be enhanced purely by informal 
sanctions. Non-monetary sanctions initially raise contributions by as much as monetary sanctions. In later 
periods monetary sanctions are more effective than non-monetary sanctions in generating high 
contribution levels. However, because of the cost of enforcing monetary sanctions, overall earnings are 
similar under the two systems. Both the Direct and Indirect Punishment Hypotheses are supported, as the 
increase in contributions caused by informal sanctions supports the IPH, while the greater long-term 
increase observed under monetary sanctions supports the DPH.   
Positive contributions, the use of costly punishment, and changes in behavior in response to 
informal sanctions are all phenomena that are inconsistent with a subgame perfect equilibrium in which 
agents non-cooperatively maximize their monetary payoff. However, there are several models, which 
when taken together, begin to point to a coherent explanation of the behavior we observe. Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) show that if some players are averse to inequities in payoffs, the availability of costly 
sanctions can increase contribution levels. The ERC model of Bolton and Axel A. Ockenfels (2000), 
which assumes that players are willing to sacrifice some absolute earnings to increase their earnings 
relative to other players, can also explain the application of costly punishment. However, these models, 
and indeed any approach that assumes that players’ decisions consider only the pecuniary payoffs to 
themselves and others, cannot explain the increase in contribution from non-monetary sanctions.  
Hollaender (1990) shows that equilibria with positive contributions can exist in the VCM game if 
agents value the approval of others. Though the Hollander model is consistent with the data from NP, it 
cannot account for differences between NP and MP, nor between NP and NS. In Hollaender’s 
interpretation of his model, approval and disapproval take the form of emotional reactions to observed 
contributions. Fehr and Gaechter (1998) also raise the potentia l role of emotions and conjecture that in 
MP, emotions make non-credible threats of monetary sanctions become credible and cause contributions 
to increase. Though it is unclear whether there can ever be a consensus on how to model emotions 
analytically, the NS data do indicate that contributions increase in response to the receipt of points for 
reasons that are not strategic.  
It appears that individuals tend to make higher contributions relative to the preceding period the 
more points they have received and the lower their contribution was relative to the group average. The 
presence of these patterns in NP and NS invites an analogy with the work of Kandel and Lazear (1992), 
Jon Elster (1998), and Bowles and Herbert Gintis (2001) who distinguish between internal peer pressure, 
called guilt, and external peer pressure, called shame. Guilt causes an individual to incur disutility from 
causing harm to others, and might be a factor in leading those who contribute less than the average to 
increase their contribution levels more than others. Shame, a disutility that occurs when others identify 
the individual as an offender, may be a factor that leads those who receive non-monetary sanctions to 
contribute more. One difference between a treatment with no punishment and with non-monetary 
punishment is that external peer pressure can be brought to bear, and our experiment suggests that 
external peer pressure can be a powerful force promoting cooperation.   
Bowles and Gintis (2001) model the VCM game with monetary punishment including both guilt 
and shame in the utility function of agents, in addition to own and others’ pecuniary payoffs, and a 
preference for reciprocating others’ contribution levels. If the receipt of points is assumed to induce 
shame, their framework explains the increase in contributions in response to the introduction of the 
sanctioning system in NP. The model is also consistent with higher contributions in MP than in NP, since 
MP has the avoidance of both shame and pecuniary penalties to promote contributions. 
In the NP and NS treatments, players who received more than 50 percent of the maximum 
possible number of points tended to increase their contributions, while those who received less did not. 
Furthermore, the relationship between the informal sanctions and the change in contribution was nuanced 
in that more points received corresponded to a greater increase in contribution. The number of points 
associated with an increase in contributions was greater than any one sanctioner, even assigning the 
maximum number of points, could impose. This is a sharp contrast to MP, where the receipt of merely 
one point was associated with an increase in the average individual’s contribution. It may be that for 
informal sanctions to be effective in altering an individual’s behavior, he must recognize that there is a 
degree of consensus among the other players that his contribution is inadequate. On the other hand, when 
a formal sanctioning system exists, one dedicated enforcer can keep contributions high. 
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1 This cooperation has been attributed to other-regarding behavior as well as to decision error. The 
presence of conditional cooperators, players who reciprocate high (low) contributions by others with high 
(low) contributions of their own (Joep Sonnemans et al., 1996; Claudia Keser and Frans van Winden, 
2000; Urs Fischbacher et al., 2001), has been identified. Thomas R. Palfrey and Jeffery E. Prisbrey (1997) 
identify a warm glow effect, in which agents receive utility from the act of contributing. Simon P. 
Anderson et al. (1998) find that pure altruism, a preference for others to have a higher payoff, is one of 
the factors that account for contributions. Gary E. Bolton et al. (2000) interpret their data as indicating the 
presence of non-linear distributive preferences.  
The decrease in contributions is consistent with a reduction in the incidence of errors over time. 
With an optimal decision at zero contribution, the only way confusion and errors can appear in the data is 
in the form of higher than predicted contribution levels.  Thomas R. Palfrey and Jeffery E. Prisbrey 
(1996) argue that decision error is the main cause of positive contributions. James Andreoni (1996) finds 
that both confusion and intentional contributions are present. The contribution rate is also higher than the 
Nash equilibrium level when the equilibrium specifies a positive level of contribution (Claudia Keser, 
1996; Martin Sefton and Richard Steinberg, 1996; Susan K. Laury et al., 1999).  
2 Jeffery Carpenter (2002) and Samuel Bowles et al. (2001) obtain similar results as Fehr and Gaechter, 
and find that when a sanctioning system is available, large groups make higher per-capita contributions 
than small groups. Toshio Yamagishi (1986) studied the effect of an exogenous sanctioning mechanism 
that was funded with voluntary contributions by group members and observed that the sanctioning system 
was indeed funded, and served to increase contribution levels. Sefton et al. (2000) replicated FG’s 
experiment with different parameters and added two treatments. In their Reward treatment, agents could, 
at a cost to themselves, give bonus payments to other agents after observing their contributions. In their 
Combined treatment, agents could both reward and punish other agents. They found that the Combined 
treatment was the most effective in promoting contributions.  
3 Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt (1999) provide a theoretical model that is consistent with DPH. They 
demonstrate that Nash equilibria with positive contribution levels can exist when the utility functions of 
agents include an aversion for inequity. However, the assumptions of the model do not necessarily imply 
DPH, since equilibria with positive contributions occur only for certain ranges of preference parameters. 
Likewise DPH can be supported for reasons other than those underlying the model. Therefore, our 
experiment does not represent a test of the Fehr-Schmidt model. 
4 Gaechter and Fehr (1999) provide two pieces of evidence that approval incentives can increase 
contribution levels. The first is questionnaire data indicating that cooperation and freeriding trigger a high 
degree of approval and disapproval respectively. The second is data from an experiment in which 
interaction between subjects that creates familiarity before they play the VCM game, in conjunction with 
public revelation of contributions and discussion after the game is played, increases contribution levels.  
Mari S. Rege and Kjetil Telle (2001) also find that revealing the identity of each group member publicly 
in a way that allows him to be associated with his contribution increases average contribution levels.  
They also observe that framing the experiment with terms such as cooperation, free-riding, and 
community, that emphasize the pro-social nature of contributions, serves to increase average contribution 
levels. 
5 There was one exception. Session number 10 was terminated due to a software crash after period 15. In 
that session, the data from 8 of 16 subjects for period 15 were also lost. Also, the data from period 15 for 
group 3 in session 2 was lost because of a computer problem and is not included in the data analysis. 
6 The data from the two locations, which do not reveal large differences, are analyzed separately in David 
Masclet et al. (2000). 
7 Several previous studies have explored whether contribution rates are different between Partners or 
Strangers (when no punishment is available) but have not reached a clear consensus. Andreoni (1988) and 
Palfrey and Prisbrey (1996) find that Strangers contribute more than Partners, while Rachel T. A. Croson 
(1996), Keser (1996) and Keser and van Winden (2000) find that Partners contribute more than Strangers, 
and Weimann (1994) finds no difference. See Andreoni and Croson (2000) for a review and survey of 
previous work in the area. As discussed previously, some of the rationale for the hypothesized effect of 
the disapproval points on contributions requires repeated interaction, which would suggest that Partner 
matching would yield higher contributions. On the other hand, Armin Falk et al. (2000), who study the 
same game as FG, find that the sanctioning pattern is similar under Partner and Stranger matching, and 
conclude that the main purpose of the sanctions is non-strategic. 
8 Notice that our Stranger matching differs from random matching by assuring that two players are never 
in the same group for two consecutive rounds. While the Stranger matching protocol did not eliminate the 
possibility for preplay communication completely, it forced such communication to be much more 
indirect. 
9 The same parameters were used in the FG study. At the group optimum, each member of the group 
contributes all 20 ECU, yielding a payoff of 32 ECU per person for the period. If every player follows his 
dominant strategy, each player receives a payoff of 20 ECU. 
10 The cost for agent i indicated in the table represented the cost to i of points assigned by i to any 
individual agent k . That is, letting Pik equal the points that i assigns to k , the table indicates K(Pik), the cost 
to player i of assigning the points to player k. The cost to i of assigning points to k  and q, K(Pik + Piq) = 
K(Pik) + K(Piq). 
11 The bold print and underling provides a strong framing emphasizing that points indicate disapproval. 
We chose the emphasis to make sure that subjects were aware that the points could potentially be used as 
a sanctioning system. The question that interested us was whether the sanctioning system, if employed, 
would promote higher contributions, rather than whether or not it would be employed at all. The same 
bold print was used in the description of the punishment points in the MP treatment. 
12 In all statistical tests reported in this paper, the unit of observation is the group for the MP and NP data, 
and the session for the NS data. 
13 Because of the large number of zero values for the dependent variable in the MP treatment, Tobit 
estimation was used for the MP data. For NP, there were very few zero values of Ptik, and therefore OLS 
estimation was used.  
 
